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The Australian Domestic Pilots' Dispute of 1989 and Its 
Implications: An Interpretation 
John Burgess and Richard Sappey* 
The 1989 domestic ,pilots' dispute in Australia provided a stark demonstration of 
the underlying conflict and tensions of the neo-corporatist Prices and Incomes Accord. 
The pilots proposed a wage incr,ease outside of the Accord guidelines but of comparable 
tnagnitude with the wag,e increases received by senior executives within the airline sector 
and senior public servants. A protracted campaign saw the government and employers, 
lvirh the tacit support of the ACIU, use a range of extreme measures against the 
Australian Federation of Air Pilats. Eventually, industrial peace was returned to the 
domestic airline sector. However, the costs, financial and emotional, of the dispute were 
considerable. The government restored industrial "order" but left considerable disquiet 
and division within the Australian trade union movement. The dispute established many 
important precedents for the business sector and the opposition Liberal/National Parties 
coalition in their push for labour market de-regulation in Australia. 
Introduction 
The Prices and Incomes Accord between the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the 
Australian Council of Trade Unions (A~CfU) has forrned the backbone of economic policy 
for the tenn of the ALP's tenure in federal office since 1981. It provides for an orderly 
framework of consent betw~een both parties over a [ange of mutual policy concerns - most 
notably wage deteirnination. The Australian fotrn of nee-corporatism has been 
characterised by a high degree of centralisation, the general absence of ~employeiS from the 
fonnal policy pfocess and the preparedness of the ACfU to directly refotrn and 
compromise many long held wage detet1nination and industrial relations principles and 
institutions. 
The 1989 Australian domestic air pilots' dispute originated with a 30 percent wag~e 
claim served by the pilots on their employers. 'The reaction to this was condemnation by 
both the government and the ACfU for being outside of the national wage principles 
which at the time allowed for wage increases of up to six percent. A long and bitter 
dispute followed in which the Australian Federation of Air Pilots (AFAP) was seve~ely 
weakened, about 600 Australian pilots accepted employment overseas while around 700 
pilots became unemployed (Norington, 1990), overseas pilots and aircraft wefe brought 
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into the domestic market, 1 the government provided financial compensation to the 
domestic airline companies, Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) planes were introduced 
into commercial operation, and common law provisions were implemenled against the 
AF.AP and its executive officers . 
The dispute was salutary in tetxns of the extent to which the government and 
employers, with the support of the ACfU and the Industrial Relations Commission (IRC), 
used financial, military and legal pressures to break the industrial power of the AFAP. 
Singleton comments that the ACfU was prepared "to abandon some fundamental 
principles of the labour movement in defence of the Accord" (1990, 189). The dispute not 
only highlighted the inner tensions and contradictions of the Accord arrangement, it also 
illustrated that in the final analysis the Accord operates through intimidation, not consent, 
and to a large extent the Australian consensus incomes policy model is a one-sided and 
coercive tool of macroeconomic management. 
This articl~e outlines and assesses the implications of the 1989 Australian domestic 
air pilots' dispute. The following issues are add.Jiessed: 
1. the nature of the Prices and Incomes Accord, ~especially its neo-corporatist 
foundations; 
2. the methods used to settle the dispute, especially the resort to disciplinary measures 
as a means of enforcing national wage principles; 
3. the strategi~es adopted by the major parti~es to the dispute; 
4. the significance of the precedents established in the dispute, especially for a 
business sector keen on deregulating the labour market; 
5. the demonstration that the principle of a "right" to industrial action in Australia 
only exists in spirit, not in law. 
The pr.ices and incomes a~ccord 
(a) History 
The Prices and Incomes Accord was negotiated between the Australian Labor Party 
(ALP) and the ACTU prior to the Federal election of 1983. At the time a Coalition 
government initiated wages freeze was in place and the economy was in the middle of a 
recession. A consensus based incomes policy undetpinning employment growth was seen 
by the signatories as an altemativ,e approach to restrictive macroeconomic policy in the 
battle against stagflation. The rationale and protracted negotiations leading up to the 
Accord agreement are outlined by Singleton (1990). In the short tetin the Accord assisted 
the electoral aspirations of the ALP and offered the ACfU a return to wage indexation 
together with some input into the policy fo1n1ulation p~ocess (Dabscheck., 1989: 45). 
The original Accofd (mark I) was not just about wages and macfoeconomic 
management. It en1braced a range of policy areas where the signatories were in 
agreement, including social welfare, health, industry development and prices supervision. 
1 
"... 1300 qualified Australians either languished in unemployment or - in a neat swap - left the 
COWltry to take jobs that the immigrant pilots could be expected to seek in nonnal circumstances" 
(Norington, 1990: 244) 
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To a large extent the Accord was seen as transposing the Swedish social consensus model 
to Australia ('See Australia Reconstructed., 1987).2 Subsequently, the ALP was elected to 
office in 1983, and one of its first tasks was to obtain broader support for the Accord, 
especially from key business representatives. This it did through the National Economic 
Summit held in mid 1983? However, at the heart of the Accord•s functioning remains 
the partnership between the government and the ACI'U, and the central concern over wage 
dete1 nlination. 
Subsequently, the Accord has remained as one of the key economic policies of the 
government. Indeed, it is one of the few areas of economic policy where there remains 
significant disagreement between the government and the LiberaVNational Parties 
opposition. It has stood the government well through three elections and has been 
renegotiated every year since 1983. 
(b) Neo-corporatist foundations 
Interest in corporatism as an economic and social strategy developed from the 
1970s in coincidence ·with the onset of stagflation. The "neo-corporatist" label has been 
applied to reflect the social democratic basis of the model and to distinguish it from the 
earlier right wing applications of corporatism such as those in Mussolini's Italy (Dufty and 
Fells, 1989: 131). In general teinls neo-corporatism has come to refer to an approach ~o 
national decision making involving the hietafchically structured and disciplined 
representative bodies of labour and capital. ln the ~contemporary applications of neo-
~corporatism it is often an arrangement between organised labour and government (Dufty 
and Fells, 1989). Other groups, including employers., are included in the fo1n1al policy 
advisory process - for example, in Australia through their participation in tripartite bodies 
such as the Economic Planning and Advisory Council and the National Labour 
Consultativ~e Council. 
The successful implementation of contemporary neo-corporatist arrangements is 








national interest takes precedence over sectional interest; 
sectional objectives (for example, wage increases) can be constrained and traded 
off via compensating policy adjustments by the government (for example, tax 
reductions) in support of the national interest; 
partners to the agreement are fully representative of constituency interests and can 
negotiate on behalf of constituents; 
partners can exefcise control over membership behaviour and in tum protect the 
legitimacy of 'their peak status; 
existing notnls and institutional arrangements are open to compromise, negotiation 
and trade-off in the pursuit of collective goals; pluralist notions of the "rules of 
The Accord also had origins in the ill-fated British social contract model of the late 1970s. It is not 
surprising that Lhc more dllidble Scandinavian model is presented as the Accord's genesis. 
The National Economic Summit fragmented employers. The Confederation of Australian Industry 
suppon. for both lhe Summit and the Accord saw lhe eventual fonnation of 'the Business Council of 
Australia representing the largest corporations. 
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the game" can be compromised in pursuit of the collective good; 
6. rational economic goals replace the ideological mores of partners as the dominant 
objective of the arrangement; nco-corporatism has been founded upon economic 
adversity, hence economic objectives become the major evaluative criteria for the 
arrangement (Head, 1990). 
However, Winkler identifies a twin administrative dilemma for neo-corporatist 
arrangements., namely: "how to deal with conflict in a system where there is supposed to 
be one ov~er-riding interest and how to avoid manifestations of coercion where people are 
supposed to co-operate spontaneously" (Winkler, 1977: 50). 
Whil~e many of the conditions for the development of a neo-corporatist arrangement 
are present or have been developed in Australia under the Accord framework, Winkler's 
twin administrative "dilemmas" were vividly demonstrated by the pilots' dispute. 
(c) Competing int~erpretations 
The durability of the Aocord in the face of adverse economic conditions, ~eal wage 
reductions, growing unemployment and sustained political opposition has been remarkable. 
In 1985/86 Australia faced a severe external shock in the fotnl of both a decline in the 
tei rns of trade coupled with an average currency depreciation of over 20 percent. 
Moreover, since 1983 average real adult award wages have declined in every year - the 
result has been one of the most significant redistributions of income from labour to capital 
this century. The operation of the Accord has coincided with a growing skewness in the 
distribution of income (Lombard, 1991) and an increase in the numbers in poverty in 
Australia (Saunders and Matheson, 1991). While significant job growth was achieved 
over 1983-88, the economy has subsequently entered a recession that has seen 
unemployment feach post World War ll recofd rates. Additionally, the Accord has been 
subject to a campaign of ,constant condemnation from the "market rationalists" in the 
media and the business sector (see Wood, 1990) and has itself been instrumental in 
galvanising the fonnation of anti-corporatist and pro-market groups collectively labelled as 
the "New Right" who have played a very active role in Australian industrial relations over 
the past decade (see Dabscheck, 1989, ch . 6). 
There are at least six different interpretations of the Accord (see Stilwell, 1986, 
ch.3). Broadly, the vie·ws can be placed into three camps: 
(i) those supportive of the Accord as a means towards securing better inflation and 
wage outcomes, for looking after the inte~ests of those not in the workforce (the 
outsiders), and for assisting a small and exposed economy adjust to frequent 
external shocks, especially in commodity prices and the ter1ns of trade (see 
Australia Reconstructed, 1987; Dixon and Keating, 1989). The Accord provides 
for a co-operation of inte~ests between the State, labour and capital. The Accord 
demonstrates the advantages inherent within a neo-corporatist arrangement. It is a 
mechanism which reduces wasteful and counter-productive conflict and behaviour, 
such as that seen in past wage-price spirals in the economy (for example, 1982/83) .. 
The Accord is an essential tool of economic management, a means of reducing 
counter-productive class conflict and acts as a framework for implementing 
progressive refonns (Singleton, 1990, ch.ll ). 
• 
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(ii) those who oppose the centralist characteristics of the process, especially the 
inclusion of trade unions into the political policy process. Trade unions are seen to 
have too much power, wage increases are greater than those that would prevail 
under competitive market conditions, and unemployment is higher than it would 
otherwise be. The market rationalist critique is presented by Moore (1989) and 
perioctically publicised by the many right wing think tanks which have 
mushroomed over the last ten years in Australia (see McGuiness, 1985). They 
oppose not only the Accofd process but its implementation through the centralised 
IRC. Their n1odel of industrial relations is ~ounded upon enterprise based 
bargaining, in-house trade unions, the elimination of awards which establish 
minimum rates of pay and the introduction of considerable legal sanctions against 
trade union industrial action.4 Neo-corporatism is seen to be fundamentally at 
odds \Yith liberalism and market individualism. 
(iii) those who oppose the Accord as a sell-out of the interests of labour, see it as an 
institutionalised method of real wage reduction and income redistribution towards 
capjtal, and as a mechanism for erocting working conditions. Critical assessments 
of the Accord (see Bramble, 1'989; Campbell, 1990; Burgess and Macdonald, 1990) 
see many of its arrangements and principles as eroding working conditions and 
trade unionisn1 in Australia. Through being incorporated into the policy process, 
trade unions loose their independence and become locked into supporting a process 
which has undermined many of the basic tenets of trade unionism at a time in 
which trade union densities ~e rapidly falling (see Berry and Kitchener, 1989). 
Neo-corporatism is an instrument for the n1anagement of labour. 
The domestic air pilots' dispute provides a very effective illustration of the Accord 
in practice and a test of the above rival interpre'tations. The argument adopted here is that 
nee-corporatism as practiced in Australia has largely been an instrument for the regulation 
and institutionalisation of labour. The major dweat of the pilots was not the size of their 
claim, but the way they pursued it outside of the Accord process.5 This was not an 
industrial dispute over an irreconcilable wage claim, it was a direct challenge to the 
Accord framework and to the authority of the ACTU and government. The AFAP 
unwittingly exposed many of the tensions and contradictions associated with this 
framework and its underlying neo-corporatist foundations. 
(d) The Accord 1in practice 
s 
While the Accord has remained in place since 1983, in substance and intent it has 
Not surprisingly for such groups there has been considerable interest generated by the 1991 New 
Zealand industrial relations re~onns. 
The AFAP was not Lhe frrst union to either di~ecdy or indirectly challenge the Accord. For 
example, in 1987, at the Special Unions' Conference, both 'the Miners' Federation and the Plumbers' 
and ~Gasfiuers~ Union refused to endorse the Accord national wage guidelines. However. unlike the 
AFAP, both of these unions continued to operate under the umbrella of the ACTU and did not 
instigate national industrial action :in suppon of their claims. 
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altered significantly. The original Accord arrangement incorporated a very wide policy 
agenda (see Stilwell, 1986, appendix). However, the periodic revisions of the Accord 
have concentrated exclusively on securing given nominal wage outcomes. Many of the 
original Accord objectives have been either ignored or directly contravened - for example, 
the complete withdrawal by the government ffom an active interventionist policy for 
industry development.6 In practice the Accord has become a wages policy and an integral 
component of macroeconomic policy management. Nominal wage outcomes are 
predictable and controllable for up to 12 months. The Accord has been presented as an 
~essential component of a policy progrnmme for the transfotrnation of the Australian 
economy that includes other components such as industry deregulation, the privatisation of 
public assets, tariff reductions and the development of fiscal responsibility. In many 
respects, over the 1980s, there is a similarity between this programme in Australia and that 
of the Btitish Thatcher government (see Rowthom, 1989). 
The six adjustments to the Accord since 1983 are all about securing wage 
outcomes consistent with macroeconomic objectives. In the process many long held wage 
principles (comparative wage justice, real wage maintenance) have been ~eroded. While 
international agencies such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (1987) have been quick to praise the Accord as a success., the reality for 
many workers is that their real wage has fallen every year since 1983. 
On the other hand prices and non-wage incomes have not been subject to such 
close regulation. The Prices Surveillance Authority, established in 1983 to support the 
Accord, does not have any powers of price control or regulation. It has been given a 
monitoring function with respect to "sensitive"' prices such as petrol. Non-wage earners 
have been major beneficiaries of the Accord process. The profits shar~e of income has 
increased while there has been a redistribution of income to the richest decile, especially 
from the middle income groups (Lombard, 1991). The salaries of corporate executives 
have increased by up to four times more than the wage increases received by Accord 
regulated ·wage earners (see Norington, 1990). Likewise, elite positions in the public 
sector have been granted significant wage and supplementary payments increases well 
beyond those received by the average wage earners - senior public servants, ~executive 
officers in tertiary education institutions, politicians, and judges. Those with capital have 
been beneficiaries of record real interest rates. At the same time the income tax rates for 
companies and the top income earners have been reduced. 
T'he pilot's dispute an ~d neo-corporatism 
In practice the Accord has been one sided in its regulation of wages and ~control 
over trade unions. It has operated as an instrument of macroeconomic management and 
has been used to pursue many of those goals associated with a rational economic poli~cy 
agenda. Neo-corporatism, Australian style, has exercised the type of control and discipline 
over trade unions that in other countries such as the UK (and more recently New Zealand) 
6 The government d.id develop specific industry plans for steel, motor vehicles and heavy engineering. 
However~ since 1'983 the direction of industry policy has been towards an elimination of an ~onns 
of industry assistance. The March 1991 industry statement announced an acceleration in the 
reduction in tariffs. 
.. 
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has required direct confrontation and conflict between government and trade unions. 
The Australian pilots' dispute illustrated that the Labor Government was prepared 
to go much further than those identified on the political right in dealing with problem 
trade unions and in enrorcing a centralist wages target. The AFAP directly challenged the 
basis of the Accord. It ignor~ed the ACfU and the centralised wage dete1nrination process 
sanctioned by the lRC. It pointed out the contradiction of the restraint applying to wage 
earners but not to non-wage ~earners, and the different rules applying to "elite" wage 
earners such as senior public servants and the judiciary. For the pilots to have succeeded 
would have demonstrated a dangerous precedent to others in the workforce, and would 
have placed the peak leadership position of the ACTU in jeopanly. The other tension of 
the AFAP action was that it exposed the vacuous position of the opposition 
Liberal/National Parties' policy for wage detern1ination and industrial relations. The 
opposition have favoured collective bargaining free from the constraints of centralised 
wage principles (see Howard, 1990). Although they have been consistent critics of the 
Accord and centralised wage deteJ.rnination, the opposition opposed the AFAP in its 
pursuit of a wage claim through collectiv~e bargaining and supported the actions of the 
government and ACfU. 
As a background to the dispute, the following details are pertinent. First, the 
AFAP was not affiliated with the ACI1J; in tum this made the ACI1J position that much 
easier in its support of the government and employers. Second, the pilots were regarded 
in the trade union movement as mavericks and elite professionals (see Jamieson, 1990), 
and not in the traditional trade union mould - many pilots received more than five times 
average weekly earnings. Within the domestic airline industry, the pilots had a history of 
collectiv,e bargaining outside of the arbitration system and a willingness to engage in 
industrial action that inconvenienced the public (McEvoy and Qw,ens, 1990: 92).7 Third, 
the don1estic airline system in Australia at the time was a strictly regula~ed duopoly 
comprised of one government owned airline (Australian Airlines) and one privately owned 
airline (Ansett Airlines). In the past the AFAP had used this to its advantage since it 
could bargain with one airline and force successful claims onto the other airline. In turn 
the airlines were in a position of market dominance and were able to effectively regulate 
fares and to pass cost increases on to consun1ers. However, the problem in 1989 was that 
this arrangement was soon to finish. From November 1990 the industry was to be 
deregulated. The 1989 wage claim was the last chanc,e for the AFAP to secure significant 
wage gains for men1bers before deregulation. For the established domestic airline 
duopoly, the wage claim pfovided an opportunity for a show-down with the AFAP for the 
purpose of altering the pilots' award in time for deregulation. Fourth, the principal private 
sector airline, Ansett, was owned by companies associated with Rupen Murdoch and Sir 
Peter Abeles. They were both experienced in dealing with uncooperntive trade unions 
through the direct involvement of their other companies in the UK Wapping print 
dispute.8 It goes without saying that the Australian media, with Murdoch's News Limited 
7 
8 
The AFAP saw its claims as being on par with those of the non-regulated executive salaries, and as 
such it saw itself as not being constrained by national wage guidelines (McEvoy and O·.vens, 1990, 
94). 
The alleged close personal relationship between these key players in the dispute and the then Prime 
Minister Bob Hawke v..'as a point the pilots emphasised and one that has been frequently publicised 
(see Pilger, 1989, ch.6). 
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dominant, were totally opposed to the AFAP and its leadership throughout the pilot's 
dispute. 
On July 26., 1989 the Federation served a 29.47 percent wage claim with the airline 
companies. The airlines refused to negotiate the claim since it was outside of the wage 
guidelines ~established under the Accord. The then guidelines provided for wage increases 
of up to six percent, except under spe{;ia] circumstances. In response, the executive of the 
AFAP directed on August 17 that members fly aircraft only between 9am and 5pm. This 
predictably put the domestic airline system into chaos as many flights were cancelled and 
others were ~escheduled to meet the reduction in flying hours. In response to a 
submission from the airlines, a federal tribunal of the IRC cancelled the award covering 
pilots on August 21. On August 23 the Federal Government authorised international 
airlines and the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) to carry domestic passengers. It also 
sanctioned domestic passenger traffic on international flights. 'The next day the domestic 
airlines filed writs for damages against pilots and on the same day the majority of pilots 
resigned from their jobs without notice. The airlines then began recruiting pilots from 
within Australia and ovetSeas, offering them individual work ~contracts. On September 12 
the Federal Government announced that it would compensate airlines for losses incurred 
because of the strike and for agreeing to employ staff who would have otherwise been 
stood down because of the dispute. 
In the face of the combined forces against them, the AFAP offered to return to 
work on September 12 on the tetrns of their now cancelled award and on condition that 
the airlines negotiate with them over their pay claim. The airlines refused and in fact 
applied to the federal tribunal for a new pilots' award which involved increased flying 
time and reduced penalty rates. McEvoy and Owens (1990: 99) comment that .. many of 
the benefits and conditions of employment which had been fought for by pilots over the 
years, such as integrated seniority lists and paternity leave, were gone". The IRC 
endorsed a new award on October 13 despite the fact that no trade union was party to it 
As McEvoy and Owens commented, "the most striking fact about these awards was that 
there were no representatives of employees as parties" (1990: 100). On October 30 the 
airlines commenced civil action in the Supreme Court of Victoria against the AFAP and 
its officials; after an expedited hearing, on November 23 the case for the airlines was 
found to be proven, with the Federation and its officials found liable to damages of 
A$6.5m. Norington (1990: 170) observed that "it was extraofdinary that a damages case 
of such proportions as the airlines could be tried, heard and decided within three months 
of the issue of writs and while the industrial dispute was still in progress". 
A legal challenge to the above decision continues as does legal action in other 
areas such as the decision of the Federal Government to fast-track immigration procedures 
for the employment of foreign "strike-breakers". In May 1990 the IR~C allowed the AFAP 
the right to represent its members before the federal tribunal. Only a fraction of the 
membership remains within the Australian domestic airline sector, despite some members 
obtaining employment with Compass Airlines. Many of the AFAP's fot1ner members are 
either employed overseas or outside of the industry, or are unemployed (Norington, 1990: 
244). 
The end result has been that the AFAP was not only defeated but severely 
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weakened financially and in te1n1s of membership.9 The airline companies now employ 
pilots under individual contracts which involve poorer conditions than those in operation 
before the dispute. The original pilots' award was cancelled by the IRC and a new award 
was endorsed by the IRC without any rrade union being a respondent to the award 
(McEvoy and Owens, 1990: 100). The government directly and indirectly compensated 
the airlines to the ofder of A$100m. In turn the defence forces were directly used to 
assist in settling the dispute. Finally foreign based airlines and pilots were directly used to 
solve a domestic labour dispute. All this occuroed with the tacit support of the ACfU. 
At no stage did the AFAP direct its members to strike action. Whether the 
limitation on flying hours constituted a strike is debateable. However, the point is that 
labour was not totally withdrawn. That the AFAP made several strategic blunders in its 
campaign and misread the extent of the organised forces opposed to it has been clearly 
documented by McDonald (1990). However., r~eg~dless of these tactical blunders, it did 
direct its members to 'WOrk Iiestrictive hours and it did direct its members to resign without 
notice (as was their contractual right), but no official strike as such ever occurred. This 
makes the government, ACfU and IRC response all the more extraordinary. 
lmpli~cations of the dispute 
What the pilots ' dispute demonstrates is getinane to an understanding of the 
conflicts and dangers present in a nee-corporatist strategy, and more importantly the 
wholesale participation in such a strategy by the trade union movement. There are 
profound implications from the pilots' dispute for individual unionists, individual ttade 
unions and the ACfU through to the industrial relations system itself which, after all, has 
a v~ested constitutional authority to settle inter-state industrial dispu~es in Australia. 
(a) Trade unions 
Throughout the dispute the Federal ~Government asserted and presented itself as the 
dominant panner in the Accord. While attacking the stance of the AFAP, the ACfU 
provided implicit support for the actions of the government, though it did not itself take 
direct actions which could be seen as condoning the strike breaking activities of the 
government. ~On the other hand, the actions of the government won the approval of 
employers and served as a clear demonstration that it would not abide by any action which 
br~eached the rules of the Accord arrangements. 
In the legal aft~e1rnath ~o the dispute, the ACIU has been ~conspicuous by its 
absence from the legal challenges by the AFAP to the various stri.k~e-breaking actions of 
the government and e,mployers (see Smith, 1990). Increasingly the indusnial r~elations 
legal framework is being superseded through the use of the law of torts and the secondary 
9 Subsequently mcn1bers did fmd employment with the new domestic airline Compass. However, the 
regrouping of the AFAP was short-lived since Compass was put into receivership in December 
1991. 
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boycott provisions of the Trade Practices Act (1974).10 Employers have seized upon 
these provisions and have achieved some notable victories over trade unions, including the 
AFAP (see Davis, 1991). Although there is a tradition of abhorrence by trade unions to 
the application of such tactics, the pilots dispute saw the government and employers, with 
the tacit support of the Acru, using such tactics. 11 More recently, these actions were 
legitimised by the ILO, which in its consideration of the ~dispute resolv~ed that the actions 
by the government and employers did not infringe convention 87 on the freedom of 
association since the social and economic consequences of the AFAP's action warranted 
the actions taken by employers and government (Moore, 1991). In tum this provided an 
important tactical precedent for employers to utilise and to bypass the industrial relations 
framework. Moore con1mented that "the resort by employers to the civil courts ... and just 
as significantly the threat to go to such courts, has been an important factor in reducing 
industrial disputation in the 1980s'' (Moore, 1991 ). 
The consequences for trade unions are that: 
1. non-industrial legal intervention is an acceptable means for resolving industrial 
disputes and for disciplining labour; the AFAP and its executive are liabl~e to 
damages of over $6m. to the domestic airlines despite the fact that they did not 
engage in strik~e activity - union funds can be confiscated and executive members 
held personally liable for any industrial activity which may affect the economic 
well being of employers and third parties. Such a tactic has been implicitly 
condoned by the govemment12, the ACTIJ and the ILO. 
2. there is the danger of moving away fron1 the traditional value system of the trade 
union movement. Established rank and file values - such as the right to pursue 
industrial action - have been challenged and overturned. Under such cUcumstances 
the internal discipline of the union mov~ement is threatened since the moral 
foundations of this discipline have been undetnnned.. If this is the ~case, then more 
pressure will be placed upon the neo-corporatist framework to impose a discipline 
on union membership in the absence of any ·moral imperative (see Smith, 1990). 
The first consequence is the more immediate for individual unions and for union 
membership. Non-industrial legal intervention was increasingly being used to resolve 
industrial disputes before the pilots' strike (see Moore, 1991).. What was unique about the 
pilots' dispute was that such a course of action was pursued by the ALP Government with 




The use of common law provisions and the Trnde Practices Act to resolve industrial disputes is 
increasing in Australia. EarHcr applications included the Mudginberry, Dollar Sweets and Robe 
River disputes. 
The Federal government did attempt in its Industrial Relations Act (1987) to restrict the access of 
employers to the common law resolution of industrial disputes. As an alternative the government 
proposed more extensive compliance sanctions within the industrial relations framework. 'The 
proposals were withdrawn by the govemn1ent after strong and concened opposition by employers 
and the media. 
The Prime :Minister did, belated I y, urge the companies to exercise ~esttaint in the use of such 
common law action. 
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domain of both government and ACfU to preserve neo-corporatist discipline.13 At a 
tjme in which the wage detet n1ination system is being fonnally decentralised with greater 
emphasis being given to collective bargaining, there must be considerable doubt on the 
ability of trade unions to effectively bargain with employers under the threat of common 
law penalties applying to any industrial action (see 'Taylor, 1990). 
In the shan tenn, the pilot's dispute has strengthened the position of the ACfU. 
First, it now has the ability to exercise coercive power over its affiliates in ~concen with 
government to protect the Accord arrangements. Individual unions are on notice if they 
wish to pursue clain1s outside of the negotiated Accord framework. Second, the 
relationship with government has been strengthened since the ACfU has demonstrated that 
it :is prepared to compro·mise traditional values in order to deliver on the neo-corporatist 
bargain. lts position as a peak ·representative has been enhanced. Third, it has 
demonstrated to ~employers that it can deliver on its side of the neo-COJ]>Oratist bargain 
under such an arrangement. 
Individual unions in Australia are now mofe at risk than at any other time this 
century fron1 the assertive application of the common law and other statutory devices 
applying to the resolution of industrial conflict. Individual claims and actions by unions 
and their officials now have to be very c~cumspect and comply with an array of common 
law, ton and trade practices law. The role of trade union officials has become 
incfeasingly proscribed within the nee-corporatist framework, their prime function is to 
implement and enforce the principles as detennined by the ACfU and the government 14 
It is not only from the legal system that unions find themselves increasingly at risk 
in Australia. The pilots' dispute demonstrated the lengths to which the government was 
prepared to go to settle the dispute on behalf of employers while retaining the integrity of 
the Accord. The government was prepared to call in the troops - in this case the RAAF -
in order to keep the industry going, for the frrst time since Prime Minister Chifley's 
decision to deploy the troops in the NSW coalfields in 1949. 'The government was 
prepared to allow international airlines to operate on domestic routes and to fast-ttack the 
employment of foreign pilots; that is, it was prepaiied to underwrite and sanction the use 
of "scab" labour.. 'The government's third supportive action for employers was to directly 
and indirectly subsidise the domestic airline companies by around A$100m. - this involved 
reduced airport charges, subsidised use of the RAAF and direct compensation. 
(b) The industr:ial relations system 
The authority and legitimacy of the IRC was being undeiinined before the pilots' 
dispute. First, as indicated previously, non-indusoial law was increasingly being used by 
en1ployers to settle industrial disputes and to discipline both unions ,and workers. Second, 
13 
14 
"ll is sympto.matic of the corporatist nature of the Austtalian industrial relations system and of the 
ACTU' s place in that system that it sided w:ith the government, the airlines and the federal :tribunal." 
(Smith, 1990, 251.) 
Ironically, the principles associated with award restructuring provide for an increased fole ~or trade 
union officials in negotiating workplace refonns and in reaching enterprise bargains. Since 1990 the 
system has moved away from centralised prescription towards decentralised negotiation. In this 
context lhe role and responsibilities of the lrade union officials have greatly expanded. 
• 
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the Accord framework saw wage principles being detet1nined and changed by the two 
Accord partners, ·with the IRC being excluded. Increasingly the function of the 
Commission was to ratify and oversee a timetable for the implementation of Accord 
principles. Third, fron1 1987 the Accord principles began to embrace a framework of 
increased collective bargaining between employers and unions to implement principles 
associated with the process of award restructuring. In this context the role envisaged for 
the IRC was that of fom1ally ratifying such arrangements. 
Throughout the airlines' dispute the Commission supported the actions of the 
government, ACfU and employers. It cancelled the award of the AFAP. It accepted the 
use of strike-breaking labour and it accepted the all encompassing character of the Accord 
arrangement. In tum it rejected the legitimacy of collective bargaining outside of the 
Accord framework. 
The irony is that in its April 1991 decision the Commission fejected the tettns of 
the 1991 Accord mark 6 wage detetnlination arrangements that included provisions for 
productivity based collective bargaining. As a result the IRC found itself being placed in 
the same position as the AFAP. That is, being identified as a danger and threat to the 
sanctity of the Accofd and its neo-corpo~atist foundations. Following the IRC's rejection 
of Accord n1ark 6 in April 1991, both the A·CTU and the government indicated that they 
were prepared to support the Accord wages' package outside of the imprimatur of the IRC 
(see Green, 1991). Paradoxically the AFAP were punished for going outside of the 
Commission and for attempting to directly negotiate with employers. The Commission 
now found itself in the same ostracised position as the AFAP - it challenged the solidarity 
of the Accord wage principles.15 
The Accord process has effectively removed the need for an industrial referee since 
wage principles are agreed upon before they arrive at the Commission. The ~enfon:ement 
function of the Commission has also been eroded with this role falling to the ACTU, the 
government and to e:mployers through the array of non-industrial laws. In the airlines 
dispute the Commission ·was left no room to compromise or to negotiate an outcome 
acceptable to employers and the AFAP. The government and the ACTU had deemed that 
any outcome outside of the Accord guidelines was unacceptable, and that any action that 
enforced these guidelines was acceptabl~e. The dispute was effectively resolved 
independently of the Commission. The combination of law suits, strike breakers, 
government financial support for employers and the industrial isolation of the AFAP by 
the ACfU effectively defeated the industrial action. The ~Commission was relegated to the 
role of a minor player. This process of the n1arginalisation of the Commission has 
subsequently continued.16 
In the longer tem1 the undetiu.ining of the Commission gives legitimacy to the 
agenda of employers and of the Coalition parties for a far more decentralised industrial 
relations system, perhaps along the lines of those industrial r~elations refot rns introduced 
l.S 
16 
Ironically the AF AP was one of the first groups to apply to the IRC for the discredited 2.5% wage 
increase under Accord mark 6. 
There was a rift between the IRC and the government over the Commission's decision in April 
1991 not to implcn1cnt .Accord wage principles. The rift has widened with a dispute over IRC 
members' salaries and the resignation of two IRC members in 1992. The government has also 
announced its intention of amending s.llS of the Industrial Relations Act in order to ~effectively 
remove fron1 the lRC the power to vet and reject enterprise agreements. 
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into New Zealand in 1991. Under these collective and contractual arrangements the role 
and importance of the Commission would be considerably diminished. Funhe1n1ore, the 
extreme measures of the government and Acru in resolving the industrial dispute provide 
a strong precedent for any future coalition government After all, they can claim that they 
are only following the lead of an ALP Government and the ACfU. When next a 
Coalition government takes offic-e in Australia it has a considerable annoury of legal and 
policy precedents to discipline either the ACfU or individual unions. That the IRC has 
had a history of flexibility in its decisions and an ability to survive cannot be doubted. 
The pilots' dispute illustrated the IRC in its flexible mode. However, lhe survival ability 
of the IRC is beside the point What was important was that survival of the Accord and 
the maintenance of the nee-corporatist arrangement took priority over the IRC. 
(c) The right to strike 
The pilots' dispute generated considerable discussion over 'the "right to strike", or 
more significantly the lack of any legal right to strike in Australia (see Green, 1990). 
Smith interpreted the success of the common law action against the AFAP as 
demonstrating "that there is no right to strike in Australia" (1990: 243). However., the 
pilots never fonnally went out on strike; their tactic was initially to reduce flying hours 
and then to subsequently resign en masse. Whether the AFAP fottnally ~engaged in strike 
action is a moot point, they were engaging in indusnial action in pursuit of a wage claim. 
In the traditional industrial ~elations afena their tactic ~could be ~egarded as l~egitimate, and 
not even extreme, since the initial withdrawal of labour was only partial and air services 
were maintained. Their subsequent resignations did amount to an almost total withdrawal 
of labour, but they w~ere no longer employees. 
If the AFAP had officially endorsed a strike, would the ~collectiv~e response of the 
other parti~es have been any different? The authority of the Accord was still under thJieat 
and employers would still hav~e been able to utilise non-industrial law remedies. It is very 
unlikely that the tactics used by the government and employers, or the outcome, would 
have been any different in the case of a fonnal strik~e. 
Indeed, the pilots' dispute once more made explicit the absence of any right to 
engage in industrial action in Australia. No union or individual union members have any 
imn1unity from the legal consequences of engaging in industrial action, whether a stop-
work ·meeting or a strike. The application of this principl~e was reinforced by the pilots' 
dispute, with the funds of the AF AP and the personal assets of its officials potentially 
available to settle the legal claims of employers and affected third parties. 
T 'WO interesting developments emerged in the afte1n1ath of the dispute. First, the 
ILO deemed that the actions of the government w~ere l~egitimate under convention 87 since 
the actions of the AFAP caused a great inconvenience to the public. This seems to 
circumscribe any application of rights or entitlements with respect to industrial action in 
Australia and elsewhere.17 Second, the government subsequently raised the possibility of 
legislating for a right to strike in order to provide some legal immunity for unions and 
17 Smith (1990: 246) suggests that by canc~elling the award and by making a new award to which no 
t.rade union was a party, lhe federal tribunal breached both convention 87 (freedom of association) 
and convention 98 (the right to organise). 
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officials from common law action.18 The irony of this proposal was not lost on 
en1ployers who quickly rejected it, citing the pilots' dispute as an example why there 
should be no such immunity (Eccleston, 1991). The actions of the government together 
with the implicit support of the ACfU in the pilots' dispute has effectiv·ely undetmined 
any future claim for in1munity from damages by trade unions in pursuit of their claims 
against employers. 
Conclusions 
The 1989 airline pilots' dispute was a watershed in Australian industrial relations. 
It demonstrated the con1mitment of the ACTU and the gov.emment to the nee-corporatist 
Accord framework. The AFAP had the potential to undettnine this neo-corporntist 
framework and to provide a precedent for other unions whose real wage aspirations have 
been restrained through the operation of the Accord process since 1983. The dispute saw 
an unprecedented collective response by government, the ACfU and employers. It saw 
the ·most draconian set of actions in the post war period applied against a union and its 
membership, short of imprisonment Moreover, it demonstrated the diminished role and 
status accolided to the Australian Industrial R~elations ~Commission in te1n1s of both its 
wage detertnination and industrial dispute resolution functions. The dispute also 
highlighted the absence in Australia of any legal right by trade unions to pursue industrial 
action over a wages clain1. 
The precedents established in the air pilots' dispute will undoubtedly haunt the 
A.CTU and the IRC. The coalition parties and employers have an opportunity to use the 
same forces as those used by the government to ensure the impl~ementation of their 
programme of industrial relations and labour mar~et refo1n1. Additionally, the need for a 
fortnal dispute resolution process must be questioned in the cont!ext of an absence of any 
legal right to engage in industrial action together with a range of common law constraints 
over industrial action. 
The dispute highlights the inner tensions of neo-corporatist arrangements. 
Consensus, the collective int~er~est and the authority of peak representatives in the end can 
only be maintained through some measures of discipline and coercion. It was only a 
matter of time before a union such as the AF AP challenged the hegemony of the Accord 
and the legitimacy of its principles. 
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